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THE BAIT AND SWITCH: EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND MINE
SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION JURISDICTION
STEVEN A. NEACE
"Law as a guide to conduct is reduced to the level of mere futility if it is
unknown and unknowable." Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Growth of the Law
3 (1924).
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal standards that aspire to alter an actor's behavior must be
readily ascertainable by that actor to be effective. This concept is not novel.
The U.S. Constitution explicitly forbids bills of attainder and ex post facto
laws.' Laws that are too vague for the ordinary citizen to understand will be
struck down under the void for vagueness doctrine.2 A law or regulation
that is clear regarding the regulated behavior may produce a similar
problem if the law or regulation applies only to a specified group or activity
that is not described with sufficient clarity. A clearly drafted law or
regulation is of little help to someone that is unable to ascertain whether he
or she is obligated to observe it. The current jurisdictional split between the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Mine
Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) presents such a problem.
Worksites are subject to MSHA jurisdiction only if they fall within
the statutory definition of "coal or other mine"3 but are otherwise subject to
OSHA jurisdiction.4 This long, unwieldy, and cryptic definition' constantly
gives rise to questions regarding which agency has jurisdiction.6 MSHA has
domain over core mining activities and, arguably, some activities, such as
road and dam building, that have an attenuated (at best) connection to core
mining activities.7 Regulated parties on the fringe are often unable to
Online Editor, Kentucky Journal ofEquine, Agriculture, and Natural Resources Law, 2011-
2012; J.D. Expected May 2012, University of Kentucky College of Law.
U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9.
'See generally City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41(1999).
30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1) (2006) (providing the definition of"coal or other mine").
Michael T. Heenan, What Sets MSHA and OSHA Apart?, PIT & QUARRY (Sept. 1, 2007),
http://www.pitandquany.com/govemment/laws-regulations/what-sets-msha-and-osha-apart.
See 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1) (2006).
6 Heenan, supra note 4.
'See e.g., MSHA v. RBK Constr., 15 FMSHRC 2099 (1993) (public highway cut); MSHA
vs. Dillingham Constr. Int'l, II FMSHRC 1351 (1989) (dam building operation); MSHA v. Drillex,
Inc., 16 FMSHRC 2391 (1994) (road building operation); MSHA v. S. Nevada Paving, 30 FMSHRC
567 (2008) (residential construction site).
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determine, prior to being cited for non-compliance, whether they are
subject to MSHA or OSHA regulations.8
In an effort to stymie the confusion, OSHA and MSHA entered into
an Interagency Agreement explaining that MSHA has jurisdiction over
mine sites and mineral milling operations while OSHA has jurisdiction in
all other instances. 9 Further, in its Program Policy Manual, MSHA
interpreted the Interagency Agreement to mean that MSHA has jurisdiction
where the purpose of an operation is to produce or extract a mineral, but not
where mineral extraction is incidental to the primary purpose of the
activity.10 Regrettably, these commendable efforts to provide clarity in an
otherwise uncertain regulatory environment may be cold comfort. On
several occasions MSHA has successfully taken the position and/or
benefited from determinations that the Policy Manual and/or Interagency
Agreement is not binding on MSHA and cannot be relied upon by regulated
parties." This outcome is consistent with the prevailing view that the
government is ordinarily not subject to the equitable defense of estoppel.12
This note argues that MSHA should be estopped from asserting jurisdiction
that it has disclaimed in the Policy Manual and/or Interagency Agreement.
Section II discusses the OSHA/MSHA regulatory regime with
emphasis on the statutory jurisdiction of each and the internal efforts of the
Department of Labor to harmonize their respective jurisdictional grants.
Section III analyzes past jurisdictional disputes and offers these disputes as
evidence that the current administrative regime has created an uncertain and
sometimes unfair regulatory environment. Section IV observes and
questions the policy that equitable estoppel is currently not available in any
capacity as a defense in MSHA regulatory enforcement proceedings.
Section V concludes that public policy would be better served by a cautious
acceptance of equitable estoppel as a defense in this context. Allowing the
See Heenan, supra note 4.
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY ADMIN., INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND THE OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, (Mar. 29, 1979), available at
http://www.osha.gov/pIs/oshaweb/owadisp.show document?p table= MOU&pid=222 [hereinafter
INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT].
10 MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., PROGRAM POLICY MANUAL: INTERPRETATIONS AND
GUIDELINES ON ENFORCEMENT OF 1977 THE ACT, 3 (Feb. 2003), available at
http://www.msha.gov/regs/complian/ppm/PDFVersion/PPM%/o20Vol%/ 201.pdf [hereinafter PROGRAM
POLICY MANUAL].
" See Dillingham, II FMSHRC at 1387 ("[S]uch policy memorandums are not binding on
the Commission and may not supercede the plain jurisdictional language found in the Act, and the
controlling case precedents"); See also Drillex, 16 FMSHRC at 2394 ("[The Secretary] also contends
that the judge correctly distinguished Drillex's operation from a borrow pit and that, in any event, the
Interagency Agreement is not legally binding on the Secretary.").
12 See Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414. 423-424, 110 S. Ct.
2465, 2471, 110 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1990) (observing the general rule that "equitable estoppel will not lie
against the Govemment as it lies against private litigants" but refusing to "embrace a rule that no
estoppel will lie against the Government").
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defense would work minimal hardship on the public interest in ensuring
occupational safety and health and would produce a regulatory environment
with greater efficiency and more predictable results.
II. THE OSHA/MSHA REGULATORY REGIME
A. MSHA Statutory Jurisdiction
The Mine Act established the Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA) and governs its activities. 13 Under the Mine Act,
"[e]ach coal or other mine, the products of which enter commerce, or the
operations or products of which affect commerce, and each operator of such
mine, and every miner in such mine shall be subject to [MSHA
Jurisdiction]."l 4 Thus, the jurisdictional reach of MSHA hinges on: (1)
interstate commerce, and (2) the definition of "coal or other mine".
Fortunately, the Mine Act defines "coal or other mine:"
"Coal or other mine" means (A) an area of land from which
minerals are extracted in nonliquid form or, if in liquid
form, are extracted with workers underground, (B) private
ways and roads appurtenant to such area, and (C) lands,
excavations, underground passageways, shafts, slopes,
tunnels and workings, structures, facilities, equipment,
machines, tools, or other property including impoundments,
retention dams, and tailings ponds, on the surface or
underground, used in, or to be used in, or resulting from, the
work of extracting such minerals from their natural deposits
in nonliquid form, or if in liquid form, with workers
underground, or used in, or to be used in, the milling of
such minerals, or the work of preparing coal or other
minerals, and includes custom coal preparation facilities. In
making a determination of what constitutes mineral milling
for purposes of this chapter, the Secretary shall give due
consideration to the convenience of administration resulting
from the delegation to one Assistant Secretary of all
authority with respect to the health and safety of miners
employed at one physical establishment."
Perhaps not so fortunately, the definition is self-evidently broad. However,
Congress explicitly intended "coal or other mine," and consequently
" 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-965 (2006).
14 30 U.S.C. § 803 (2006).
" 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1) (2006).
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MSHA's jurisdictional grant, to be interpreted as broadly as possible.16
The dividing line between OSHA and MSHA jurisdiction is composed of
the stated Congressional intent to confer broad jurisdiction on MSHA and
the foregoing definition of "coal or other mine." It is, accordingly, also the
dividing line between an obligation to comply with OSHA regulations and
an obligation to comply with MSHA regulations.
B. OSHA Statutory Jurisdiction
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970'1 established and
delineates the authority of the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA). In establishing OSHA Congress sought "through
the exercise of its powers to regulate commerce among the several States
and with foreign nations and to provide for the general welfare, to assure so
far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and
healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources."" The
precise reach of OSHA jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this note. It is
sufficient to observe from the foregoing that OSHA's jurisdictional grant is
broader than MSHA's jurisdictional grant. It may be useful to think of
OSHA standards as providing default occupational health standards and
MSHA standards as preemptive of those default standards when its
jurisdiction is triggered. That is, if a particular activity falls within the
definition of "coal or other mine,"' 9 then MSHA standards apply; if it does
not, then OSHA has jurisdiction. Accordingly, if MSHA is deprived of
jurisdiction in a given case, the result is not an utter lack of occupational
health standards; rather, the result is that OSHA occupational health
standards apply.
C. The Difficulty of Overlapping Jurisdiction
The basic relationship between OSHA and MSHA jurisdiction is
that, at least with regard to occupational hazards, "MSHA has jurisdiction
over safety and health at mines," and "OSHA has jurisdiction over just
about everything else." 2 0 The key to defining jurisdiction here is the
comprehensive, if not cryptic, definition of "coal or other mine"2 .
"Congress foresaw that this definition might spawn turf battles between
16 See Marshall v. Stoudt's Ferry Preparation Co., 602 F.2d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 1979)
("Commenting on this sweeping definition, the Senate Committee stated that 'what is considered to be a
mine and to be regulated under this Act' was to be given the broadest possible interpretation and that
doubts were to be resolved in favor of inclusion of a facility within the coverage of the Act.")
1729 U.S.C. § 651-678 (2006).
s29 U.S.C. § 65 1(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
1 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1) (2006).
20 Heenan, supra note 4.
2' 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1) (2006).
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MSHA and its sister agency OSHA, or confusion on the part of
employers."22 Accordingly, Congress, in its jurisdictional grant to MSHA,
advised that the Secretary of Labor, when facing confusion, should give
"due consideration to the convenience of administration resulting from the
delegation to one Assistant Secretary of all authority with respect to the
health and safety of miners employed at one physical establishment." 23
What followed was an Interagency Agreement between OSHA and MSHA
intended to guide employers and employees, delineate the sphere of
influence of each agency, and serve as a mechanism for settling competing
claims of jurisdiction.24
D. The OSHA/MSHA Interagency Agreement
MSHA and OSHA entered into an Interagency Agreement "to set
forth the general principle and specific procedures that will guide MSHA
and OSHA," and to "serve as guidance to employers and employees in the
affected industries in determining the jurisdiction of the two statutes
involved." 25 The general principal of the agreement is that MSHA rules
apply with regard to unsafe and unhealthful working conditions on mine
sites and mineral milling operation sites while OSHA rules apply in all
other contexts. 26 When addressing any questions of conflicting jurisdiction,
the relevant MSHA District Manager and OSHA Regional Administrator
should first attempt to resolve the conflict at the local level by considering
both the Interagency Agreement and any other relevant law and policy. 27 If
the two aforementioned parties are unable to agree on the issue, the
Interagency Agreement instructs them to refer the matter to the Secretary of
Labor for a final decision.28
E. The MSHA Policy Manual
MSHA's Policy Manual interprets the Interagency Agreement to
mean that "MSHA has jurisdiction over operations whose purpose is to
extract or to produce a mineral. [But] MSHA does not have jurisdiction
where a mineral is extracted incidental to the primary purpose of the
activity."29 Continuing with that theme, the Policy Manual provides:
2 2 MSHA Jurisdiction: Where, Oh Where, Will It End?, CROWELL & MORING MINING LAW
MONITOR, http://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/Publications/Articles/1350057 (last visited Mar. 27,
2012). 231d.
24 INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT, supra note 9.
25 id.
26 id.
27 Id.
28 id.
29 PROGRAM POLICY MANUAL, supra note 10.
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Under this circumstance, a mineral may be processed and
disposed of, and MSHA will not have jurisdiction since the
company is not functioning for the purpose of producing a
mineral. Operations not functioning for the purpose of
producing a mineral include, but are not limited to, the
following: (1) key cuts in dam construction (not on mining
property or used in mining); (2) public road and highway
cuts; (3) tunnels, a. railroad, b. highway, c. water diversion,
etc.; (4) storage areas, a. gas, b. petroleum reserves, c. high
and low level radioactive waste. The question of
jurisdiction in these and similar types of operations is
contingent on the purpose and intent for which the facility
is being developed.3 0
This formulation of MSHA jurisdiction is elegant. It also has the practical
advantage of keeping core mining activities squarely within MSHA's
jurisdiction and excluding activities that have only an attenuated connection
with mining. Further, it lends itself to relatively predictable outcomes.
III. JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES
A. The Definition of "Coal or Other Mine "
The case law and administrative decisions are replete with
examples of the difficulty that the present jurisdictional framework between
OSHA and MSHA has engendered. For example, in Pennsylvania Electric
Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, the court faced the
question of whether MSHA or OSHA had jurisdiction in connection with
the handling and processing of coal in an electric generating plant in Homer
City, Pennsylvania.3' In that case, the plant, using conveyor belts,
transported coal from two adjacent mines to a processing facility that
prepared the coal for use in the plant.32 Thereafter, the conveyors took the
coal to the plant for use in generating electricity. 33
The dispute in Pennsylvania centered on whether MSHA had
jurisdiction over the conveyer belts used to transport the processed coal
from the processing facility to the plant.34 MSHA had been regulating the
processing facility itself since 1977, but had never before exercised
jurisdiction over the off-site conveyers used to carried processed coal to the
30 Id.
31 Pennsylvania Electric Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 969 F.2d 1501,
1502 (3d Cir. 1992).
32Id. at 1503.
3 Id.
34 id.
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electric plant.35 Accordingly, the plant argued that OSHA, and not MSHA
regulations, applied inasmuch as the conveyer belts were not a "coal or
other mine" covered by the Mine Act.36 The court had little difficulty
concluding that the conveyer system fell within the statutory definition of
"coal or other mine" because the statutory definition provides that
"structures, facilities, equipment, machines, tools or other property ... used
in, or to be used in, or resulting from, . . . the work of preparing coal" are
included.3 ' Thus, according to the court, the plain language of the Mine Act
controlled the outcome of the case.
In Herman v. Associated Electric Coop., a divided panel of the 8th
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision to uphold
MSHA jurisdiction over another electric power plant.39 The electric plant,
in Missouri, purchased coal that was delivered to it by rail from two mines
in Wyoming. 4 0 After receiving the coal, the plant prepared the coal for
combustion using several processes such as crushing the coal and screening
the coal to remove metal debris.41 Upon receiving complaints regarding
coal dust at the facility, an OSHA inspector conducted a preliminary air
quality inspection and referred the matter to MSHA for a determination of
which entity had regulatory authority over the plant.4 2 The controversy in
this case arose when the plant denied access to an MSHA inspector on the
grounds that OSHA, not MSHA, had the authority to regulate the plant's
43
activities.
MSHA followed roughly the same pattern that it had success with
in Pennsylvania Electric Co., arguing that the coal processing activities that
took place at the electric plant amounted to "the work of preparing coal",
which falls within the Mine Act's definition of "coal or other mine".44 That
definition also includes "the breaking, crushing, sizing, cleaning, washing,
drying, mixing, storing, and loading of bituminous coal, lignite, or
anthracite, and such other work of preparing such coal as is usually done by
the operator of the coal mine". 45 Because the power plant's activities
indisputably did involve crushing, breaking, sizing, and cleaning the coal,
the District Court, relying in part on the decision in Pennsylvania Electric
35 Id.
36 Idr.
" Pennsylvania. Electric Co., 969 F.2d at 1503 (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1)).
3 Id. at 1504.
3 Herman v. Associated Electric Coop., Inc., 172 F.3d 1078, 1080 (8th Cir. 1999).
40 Id.
41 lar
42 id.
43 Id.
" Herman v. Associated Electric Coop., Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1147, 1552-53 (E.D. Mo. 1998),
rev'd, 172 F.3d 1078 (8th Cir. 1999); see also Pennsylvania Electric Co., 969 F.2d 1501 (holding that a
conveyor system used to carry coal to an electricity plant was under MSHA's regulatory jurisdiction).
4s Herman, 994 F. Supp. at 1153 (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 802(i) (2006)).
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Co., was satisfied that the activities of the power plant were covered by
the definition of "coal or other mine" in the Mine Act.4 6
Unlike the district court, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals was not
convinced that the power plant's crushing and sizing of coal, which it had
purchased from a coal mine in Wyoming, was sufficient to trigger MSHA
jurisdiction. 7 According to the divided panel, not all businesses that
perform tasks listed under "the work of preparing coal" in the Mine Act can
be considered mines without MSHA jurisdiction extending to unfathomable
lengths.4 8 Accordingly, the court, explicitly disagreeing with the 3rd
Circuit, held that the power plant's coal processing operations would
remain subject to OSHA jurisdiction.49
Bush & Burchett, Inc. v. Reich is another example of a turf battle
between MSHA and OSHA.so In this case Heartland Resources had a
contract with Bush & Burchett, Inc. to have a bridge built over the
Guyandotte River in West Virginia.5' Heartland Resources needed the
bridge to connect a coal mine on one side of the river to a railroad loadout
facility on the other side of the river.5 2 Heatland agreed that upon
completion it would convey the bridge to the West Virginia Department of
Transportation to integrate the bridge into the state's road system. 53
Following two fatalities during bridge construction and a union complaint
respectively, OSHA inspected the bridge site and issued citations on June
20, 1991 and September 4, 1991.54 Heartland Resources believed that
MSHA did not have jurisdiction over the bridge construction site. 5 MSHA
initially agreed with Heartland Resources' belief but later issued a citation
to Heartland Resources on September 10, 1991 for failure to berm the haul
road from the mine site down to the bridge, as was required by MSHA
regulations. 56 Heartland Resources remedied the matter by installing the
berms, but subsequently removed them in response to a letter from the West
Virginia Department of Transportation indicating that the berms were
causing erosion and drainage problems.
Heartland Resources challenged OSHA's authority, asserting that
OSHA's jurisdiction over the bridge site had been preempted by MSHA.58
Heartland Resources' argument was supported by the fact that MSHA was
4 6 Id. at 1154.
47 Herman, 172 F.3d at 1083.
48 Id. at 1082 (internal citation omitted).
49 Id. at 1083.
5o Bush & Burchett, Inc. v. Reich, 117 F.3d 932 (6th Cir. 1997).
" Id. at 933.
52 Id,
" Id. at 934.
54 Id. at 935.
5 Id. at 934.
56 Bush & Burchett, Inc., 117 F.3d at 934.
s7 Id.
" Id. at 933.
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the most recent agency to take regulatory action. 59 Heartland Resources
argued that the bridge construction site was a "[road] appurtenant to" an
area where minerals were extracted and, therefore, covered by the text of
the definition of "coal or other mine" in the Mine Act. 6 0 The court conceded
that Heartland Resources' argument had merit because of the expansive
definition of "coal or other mine," but nonetheless rejected the argument
because "it was contrary to common sense." 6' The court explained that, if
Heartland Resources' argument were credited, then "MSHA jurisdiction
could conceivably extend to unfathomable lengths since any road
appurtenant to a mine that connects to the outside world would necessarily
run into yet other roads, thus becoming one contiguous road." 62
Accordingly, the court upheld the citations OSHA issued to Heartland
Resources.
B. The Interagency Agreement & MSHA Policy Manual
Jurisdictional disputes do not hinge only on the definition of "coal
or other mine," sometimes sub-legislative policy like the Interagency
Agreement and the MSHA Policy Manual comes into play. For example, in
MSHA vs. RBK Construction, MSHA issued citations to RBK Construction
for failure to adhere to MSHA regulations in performing a contract with the
Nevada Department of Transportation to do a "cut and fill" operation, or
road construction.64 In defense of the citations, RBK Construction asserted
that any mineral extraction in which had engaged was incidental to the
primary purpose of finishing the public highway cut.65 RBK Construction
argued, therefore, that MSHA did not have jurisdiction over the highway
cut pursuant to the Interagency Agreement and the provisions of the MSHA
Policy Manual disclaiming MSHA jurisdiction over mineral extraction
incidental to the primary purpose of the activity.66
Upon review of the matter, the Secretary of the Department of
Labor agreed that any mineral extraction was incidental to the primary
67
purpose and elected to vacate the citations against RBK Construction. The
administrative law judge, however, determined that the Secretary was
without authority to vacate the citations because the highway cut met the
statutory definition of a "coal or other mine." 68 In the subsequent
"
9See id at 934-35.
60 Id. at 936-37.
61 Id. at 937.
62 Bush & Burchett, Inc., 117 F.3d at 937.
63 Id. at 940.
6 MSHA v. RBK Constr., 15 FMSHRC 2099, 2099 (1993)
65 Id.
6 See id.
67 Id.
61 Id. at 2100.
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interlocutory appeal to the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review
Commission (The Commission),69 the administrative law judge's order
denying MSHA's motion to dismiss was overruled. 70 The Commission did
not object to the Administrative Law Judge's characterization of the cut and
fill operation as a "coal or other mine" subject to MSHA jurisdiction;
rather, it concluded that, notwithstanding whether the operation was or was
not a mine, the Secretary was acting within his discretion in vacating the
citations.7 1
The Commission addressed the MSHA Policy Manual again in
MSHA v. Dillingham Construction International.7 2 The Army Corps of
Engineers and the Puerto Rican government hired Dillingham Construction
International (Dillingham) to construct a dam.73 During the dam building
operations, Dillingham was issued citations by MSHA inspectors.74
Subsequently, Dillingham asserted that MSHA's jurisdiction was not
triggered because there was no "coal or other mine" and that any mineral
mining was only incidental to the primary purpose of the activity, dam
building.
The MSHA Policy Manual includes "key cuts in dam construction"
as mineral mining that is incidental to the primary purpose of the activity.76
Given that its activity was explicitly listed as an example of incidental
mineral extraction, one would think that Dillingham's argument would have
been difficult for MSHA to overcome. However, MSHA countered that the
dam site was chosen in part because of a nearby, abundant supply of
limestone, which Dillingham would have to purchase on the open market if
not obtained from the deposits nearby the dam construction site.
The record demonstrated that Dillingham used the nearby limestone
deposits in dam construction after preparing the material itself.78 MSHA
argued that, pursuant to the statutory definition of "coal or other mine," this
activity constituted mineral milling and brought Dillingham's activities
within the scope of the Mine Act. 79 The Commission agreed that
69 The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (FMSHRC) is related to, but
independent of, the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). Broadly speaking, MSHA has
policymaking and prosecutorial responsibility, such as responsibility for promulgating occupational
safety and health standards and for prosecuting violations of those standards. The FMSHRC, on the
other hand, has responsibility for adjudicating alleged violations of the safety and health standards
promulgated and prosecuted by MSHA. Each entity exists independently of the other. Paul R. Verkuil,
The Purposes and Limits ofIndependent Agencies, 1988 Duke L.J. 257, 268 (1988).
70 RBK Constr., 15 FMSHRC at 2101.
71 Id.
72 MSHA v. Dillingham Constr. Int'l, 11 FMSHRC 1351 (1989).
73 Id. at 1351.
7 Id at 1352-54.
7 Id at 1352.
76 Id at 1382 (quoting MSHA, POLICY MEMORANDUM NO. 88-2M (Oct. 23, 1986)).
n1 Id. at 1386-87.
7 Dillingham, 11 FMSHRC at 1387-88.
" See id at 1386-87.
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Dillingham's activities fell within the statutory definition and explicitly
rejected Dillingham's reliance on the Policy Manual as follows:
The respondent's reliance on the language found in the
MSHA policy manual of July 1, 1988, which states that
MSHA has jurisdiction only over operations whose purpose
is to extract or to produce a mineral, and does not have
jurisdiction where a mineral is extracted incidental to the
primary purpose of the activity is rejected. In the first place,
such policy memorandums are not binding on the
Commission and may not supercede the plain jurisdictional
language found in the Act, and the controlling case
precedents. Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., BNA 4
MSHC 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Further, as correctly pointed
out by the petitioner, the limestone material extracted by the
respondent is extracted for its intrinsic value as a
commodity.... In short, the availability, extraction,
processing, and use of the limestone is a critical part of the
dam construction activity.
Stated differently, the Commission held that MSHA could not be estopped
by the language in its policy manual that disclaims jurisdiction over
incidental mineral extraction.
The Commission addressed MSHA jurisdiction in the context of a
residential construction site in MSHA v. Drillex.8 1 Drillex had been hired to
perform blasting, drilling, rock excavation, and crushing of excavated
rock.82 The rock was to be utilized as fill material for building a road in
connection with a project to construct over two hundred residential units.83
The Secretary argued that MSHA had jurisdiction over Drillex based on
precedent indicating jurisdiction exists when minerals are excavated and
separated for a particular use.84 Drillex countered that there was no
precedent in support of MSHA jurisdiction over a construction site where
minerals were extracted only as an incident to the construction of roads for
the project, and not for the inherent value of the materials extracted.
"[D]espite the fact that the Project [was] far from what is viewed
traditionally as a 'mine'," the Commission upheld MSHA jurisdiction over
the site because there was at least some measure of mineral extraction,
o Id. at 1387.
See generally MSHAv. Drillex, Inc., 15 FMSHRC 1941 (1993).
82 Id. at 1942.
13Id at 1942-43.
84Id. at 1944 (internal citations omitted).
85 id.
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preparation, or milling present.86 The Commission observed that,
pursuant to the Interagency Agreement, the essential operation in "milling"
is the "separation of one or more valuable desired constituents of the crude
from undesired contaminants with which it is associated."87 The
Commission explained that, because Drillex screened clay from the rock,
sized it, and otherwise treated the rock as a "valuable desired constituent of
the crude," it was engaged in "milling."8 8 Finally, the Commission
conceded that "that there is no precedent for the imposition of Mine Act
jurisdiction at a construction project where minerals are extracted solely for
road construction at the project -- a purpose incidental to the main objective
of the project--," and countered that there is not "a prohibition of the
exercise of Mine Act jurisdiction." 89
The Commission addressed a regulated party's reliance on the
Interagency Agreement again in Southern Nevada Paving v. MSHA.90
Southern Nevada Paving (SNP) was a contractor working for Howard-
Hughes Properties in connection with a large construction project in
Summerlin, Nevada.91 The project necessitated "excavating, landscaping,
filling, grading, and preparing construction sites for residential buildings,
commercial buildings, utilities, Beltway 215, and other roadways." 92 In
addition, "scraping, excavating, loading, moving, and depositing spoil
materials consisting of soils, shrubs, roots, trash, and organic and non-
organic materials" were required.93 SNP screened piles of the spoil to
remove trash and organic material, crushed it, and then used it at the
construction site for leveling and filling purposes or, in some instances, sold
the material to sand and gravel customers.94 MSHA argued that this activity
constituted mineral milling and, therefore, that SNP's crushers were mines
within the meaning of the Mine Act and MSHA jurisdiction was proper.95
SNP countered that: (1) mere "operation of the crushers as an integral part
of the construction project did not convert construction to mining," and (2)
the crushing of the spoil material was not mineral milling within the
meaning of the Interagency Agreement because it did not separate valuable
mineral from worthless spoil and the end product contained no known
mineral of value.96
6Id. at 1945-47.
'
7Drillex, 15 FMSHRC at 1946.
"Id at 1947.
Id. at 1945.
90 MSHA v. S. Nevada Paving, 30 FMSHRC 567 (2008).
9
'Id at 568.921d
931d.
9 4Id. at 570-72.
"Id at 572.
96 S. Nevada Paving, 30 FMSHRC at 572-73
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The Commission held that the crushing of material to make
aggregate base is considered mineral milling under the Mine Act.97 In doing
so, the Commission rejected SNP's reliance on the Interagency
Agreement's characterization of mineral milling as separating valuable
mineral from worthless spoil, stating: "[i]n spite of the referenced language
in Appendix A [of the Interagency Agreement], the Secretary has
consistently interpreted the term milling to include milling operations in
which the separation of valuable from valueless materials does not occur." 98
The Commission was satisfied that: (1) the only support for SNP's
interpretation of the term mineral milling was the Interagency Agreement,
and (2) nothing in the language of the Mine Act suggested that separation
of valuable from valueless mineral was a prerequisite for mineral milling to
occur. 99 Accordingly, the Commission sided in favor of MSHA.'00
C. The Consequences ofJurisdictional Miscalculation Can be Severe
Under the current jurisdictional framework, it is often very difficult
for regulated parties to know whether MSHA or OSHA has jurisdiction
over their business activity. The consequences of a mistake can be
significant and, in many cases, extend much further than the initial fines
and penalties that may be assessed despite an attempt to comply with the
wrong rule or a wayward interpretation of a rule. An example, is Air
Products & Chemicals v. MSHA, MSHA had jurisdiction over a company
that processed coal refuse.'o' The grounds for jurisdiction, i.e. the nature of
the activity, were similar to those relied upon in Pennsylvania Electric Co.,
where the court upheld MSHA jurisdiction over conveyer belts leading
from a coal processing facility to a power plant.102
In Air Products & Chemicals, the defendants operated a plant that
burned coal refuse to produce steam and electricity.103 Coal refuse is
composed of rock fragments unavoidably removed from the earth during
the coal mining process and small amounts of coal not separated during
processing. The primary source of these rocks and minerals is normally the
formations immediately above and below the coal seam and the sediments
within the seam.104
9Id. at 574.
981d.
"Id. at 572.
...ld. at 577.
0' Air Prods. & Chems. v. MSHA, 15 FMSHRC 2428 (1993).
102 Id. at 2431 (citing Pennsylvania Electric Co. v. FMSHRC, 969 F.2d 1501 (3d. Cir. 1992)).
103 Air Prods. & Chems., 15 FMSHRC at 2429.
104 MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., ENGINEERING AND DESIGN MANUAL: COAL REFUSE
DISPOSAL FACILITIES, at 2-2 (2d ed. 2009), available at
http://www-xx .msha.gov/Impoundments/DesignManual/20091mpoundmentDesignManual.pdf
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Prior to their building of the plant, an MSHA official informed
the defendants that, based on the activity expected to take place there,
MSHA would not have jurisdiction. 105 Accordingly, the defendants built the
plant with OSHA specifications in mind and trained their employees to
comply with OSHA standards.106 After the construction was completed,
OSHA conducted a routine inspection of the plant and issued citations. 0 7
Roughly one year later, MSIIA decided that the plant, or at least
some areas of it, did fall within MSHA's statutory jurisdiction because the
defendants were also processing the coal refuse and were therefore involved
in the "work of preparing coal".108 When the defendants challenged
MSHA's jurisdiction, the Commission sided with MSHA, holding that at
least some activity at the plant amounted to "the work of preparing coal." 09
The Commission was not persuaded by the administrative law judge's
decision that MSHA jurisdiction was improper because it was exercised on
an ad hoc and unilateral basis, rather than as the product of a reasoned
resolution of the jurisdictional question with OSHA pursuant to the
Interagency Agreement." 0 In a dissenting opinion, Chairmen Holen
declared that:
[I]f a coal consumer becomes a coal preparation facility
within the meaning of [the Mine Act] by engaging in any
of the activities listed in section 3(i), 30 U.S.C. § 802(i),
the Mine Act potentially reaches every end user of coal.
Such a broad interpretation is ultimately at odds with the
legislative history of the Mine Act, which is directed to
safety and health problems associated with mining
activity. "'
Chairmen Holen also expressed "concern that indications of conflicting
safety enforcement authority by the Secretary of Labor through MSHA and
OSHA create confusion, compromise safety and reduce productivity, as
shifting policies force operators to modify facilities and work processes."ll 2
In the end, the defendants were left with a refuse plant designed to OSHA
specifications, employees trained to comply with OSHA regulations, and
MSHA jurisdiction over the refuse plant.
1os Air Prods. & Chems., 15 FMSHRC at 2429.
106 Id.
1o7 Id.
'0 Id. at 2429-30.
'9 Id. at 2431.
0 od at 2432.
"1 Air Prods. & Chems., 15 FMSHRC at 2437 (Chairman Holen, dissenting).
112 Id. at 2438 (internal citation omitted).
430
IV. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
A. Generally
The doctrine of equitable estoppel provides a possible theoretical
basis for binding agencies to pronouncements like the Interagency
Agreement and the MSHA Policy Manual.113 If credited as a defense,
equitable estoppel would forbid MSHA from taking inconsistent positions
regarding its jurisdiction to the detriment of a party invoking the
doctrine.114 For example, a regulated party might claim that MSHA should
be estopped from claiming that it has jurisdiction over mineral mining that
is incidental to the primary purpose of the activity because this would be
inconsistent with the pronouncement in the MSHA Policy Manual that
MSHA does not have jurisdiction over such activity.
Invoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel against a governmental
entity is very difficult.'15 In this context, "many courts view estoppel as an
extraordinary remedy and will require some affirmative misconduct by the
agency" as a precondition for a claim of equitable estoppel.' 16 A prima facie
case of equitable estoppel would, at a minimum, require the party seeking
to invoke the doctrine to show the following: "(1) the government had
knowledge of the facts, (2) the government intended that its conduct be
acted upon or acted in a manner so that the party asserting the defense had a
right to believe it so intended, (3) the party asserting the estoppel defense
was ignorant of the true facts, and (4) that the party asserting the estoppel
defense relied on the governments conduct to his or her detriment".'1
On the basis of the foregoing factors, a regulated party that relied
upon the MSHA Policy Manual and/or Interagency Agreement should have
a convincing prima facie claim of estoppel in the ordinary case. First, it
would seem as though MSHA is aware of the activity that is taking place
and believes it has jurisdiction or else it would not be issuing citations.
Second, it seems clear that MSHA intended for its representations to be
relied upon because express language in the MSHA/OSHA Interagency
Agreement, which the Policy Manual purports to interpret, provides that it
is intended to guide "employers" and "employees.""' Third, while it may
be difficult for a regulated party to show in a given case that it was ignorant
"3 Regulation Without Rulemaking: The Force and Authority of Informal Agency Action, 47
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 5, at § 503(4)(d) (2001)
"1 id.
" ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST., supra note 113, at § 503(4)(d). See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 13.
116 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST., supra note 113, at § 503(4)(d).
"'7 Mary V. Laitos, Danielle V. Smith & Amy E. Mang, Equitable Defenses Against the
Government in the Natural Resources and Environmental Law Context, 17 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 273,
285 (2000) (citing United States v. Georgia-Pac. Co., 421 F.2d 92, 96 (9th Cir. 1970)).
" See INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT, supra note 9.
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of the true facts, i.e. that reliance is reasonable, MSHA would at least be
prevented from taking the position that the representations in its Policy
Manual are a nullity. Lastly, detrimental reliance should not be difficult to
establish in most cases because a citation will presumably have been issued
and the regulated party will likely argue that fines/penalties could have
been avoided if it had not relied to its detriment on the Policy Manual.
B. Equitable Estoppel is not a Viable Defense
Notwithstanding the foregoing, a brief and non-exhaustive review
of cases, discussed below, in which equitable estoppel was raised as a
defense tends toward an understanding that the defense is rarely, if ever,
credited in MSHA enforcement proceedings. This is the expected result
given general administrative and judicial reluctance to estop government
entities.11 9 Also, as we saw in Dillingham Construction International, the
Commission has, on one occasion, declared explicitly that the MSHA
Policy Manual cannot bind, or estop, MSHA from asserting jurisdiction.120
In Emery Min. Corp. v. Sec'y ofLabor, the Commission determined
that Emery had violated the miner training requirements of the Mine Act by
failing to have an approved training plan in place and not providing the
appropriate amount of training. 121 The Department of Labor had installed an
administrative regulation, 30 C.F.R. § 48.8(a), that purported to require
eight hours of refresher training "annually," as opposed to the "once each
12 months" requirement in the Mine Act.12 2 When Emery was cited by
MSHA for waiting over 15 months to provide refresher training to several
of its employees, it argued that it was still in compliance with 30 C.F.R. §
48.8(a) because "annual" training only meant that it had to provide the
refresher training at some point each calendar year rather than within 12
month intervals, as the text of the Mine Act would seemingly have
required.123
The court acknowledged that "the record [reflected] some
confusion surrounding MSHA's approval of Emery's training plan;" it
appeared as though MSHA officials were aware of Emory's "annual"
certification practice and acquiesced in it for at least two years. 124 However,
the court squarely rejected Emery's estoppel claim:
"9 Laitos, Smith & Mang, supra note 117, at 295.
20 MSHA vs. Dillingham Constr. Int'l, 11 FMSHRC 1351, 1387 (1989).
121 Emery Mining Corp. v. Sec'y of Labor, 744 F.2d 1411, 1413 (10th Cir. 1984) (citing 30
U.S.C. § 825).
122id
123 Id. at 1414.
124 Id. at 1415-16.
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Whatever their position within the agency, the MSHA
officials who approved Emery's plan clearly had no
authority to waive the Act's requirements and bind the
government to what amounts to an amendment of the
statutory language. Particularly where mandatory safety
standards are concerned, a mine operator must be charged
with knowledge of the Act's provisions and has a duty to
comply with those provisions. To the extent Emery relied
on an interpretation by MSHA officials of the Act's
implementing regulations, Emery assumed the risk that that
interpretation was in error.12
Thus, the court found no grounds for administrative estoppel either
on the basis of C.F.R. § 48.8(a) or on the basis of representations made to
Emory by MSHA officials. 12 6 It was, additionally, "far from clear [to the
court] that the requirements for equitable estoppel [were] met in this case"
because Emery received notice of MSHA's change in position on the
interpretation of C.F.R. § 48.8(a) that training was required every 12
months. 127 The court held that Emery could have "acted promptly" to avoid
being cited and, therefore, any continued reliance on any misrepresentations
by MSHA was unreasonable and the principles of equitable estoppel were
precluded. 128
More pointed rejection of equitable estoppel as a viable defense in
MSHA regulatory enforcement proceedings can be found in the decisions
of the Commission. King Knob Coal Co. stands for the proposition that
equitable estoppel ordinarily will not serve as a defense in MSHA
enforcement proceedings.129 In King Knob Coal Co. there was "a conflict
between a mandatory safety and health standard and MSHA's purported
interpretation of that standard in its interim inspector's manual."o30 King
Knob Coal Co. argued that it was entitled to rely on the interpretation of the
mandatory safety and health standard given by MSHA in its interim
inspector's manual because MSHA should be estopped by the manual and
held to its interpretation of the standard therein.'
The Commission acknowledged, both that the manual invited
reliance and that it contained no disclaimer that it was not a binding source
of law, but nonetheless rejected King Knob Coal Co.'s estoppel
1' Id. at 1416 (internal citation omitted).
'
2 See id. at 1415-17.
127 Emery Mining Corp., 744 F.2d at 1417.
128id
i"Id.
129 King Knob Coal Co., 3 FMSHRC 1417-18.
3
oId. at 1417.
"' Id. at 1417-18.
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argument.132 The Commission first, and accurately, explained that the
Supreme Court has taken the position that estoppel ordinarily does not
apply as against the federal government.13 3  Next, Commission
acknowledged a trend in lower federal courts of permitting estoppel in
some instances, but, because the Supreme Court had not approved this
trend, stated that "fidelity to precedent [required the Commission] to deal
conservatively with this area of the law." 34 Finally, the Commission stated
that penalty mitigation, rather than estoppel, was a more appropriate
response to regulated parties burdened by conflicting MSHA
pronouncements.'13  That is, the Commission was of the opinion that
fines/penalties could be reduced to account for any perceived injustice. The
Commission decided King Knob Coal Co. in 1981, but more recent
authorities confirm that it still represents the Commission's view of
estoppel.136
C. Wholesale rejection ofEquitable Estoppel is Bad Policy
Two goals support the application of estoppel against government
entities, like MSHA: (1) "the government should be prevented from taking
unconscionable advantage of its own wrong," and (2) "the government
should be prevented from asserting legal rights where such an assertion
would work a fraud or injustice on a private party acting in good faith."'3 7
While both of these goals would arguably be well served by requiring
MSHA, rather than regulated parties, to bear the burden of conflicting or
faulty pronouncements regarding jurisdiction, a third and perhaps even
weightier goal would also be furthered: enhanced clarity and certainty
within the OSHA/MSHA regulatory regime. In a system where regulated
parties are often unable to determine what rules to follow, it stands to
reason that MSHA expends considerable time and effort litigating to
compel compliance with occupational health and safety standards that
regulated parties might have complied with on their own if they had known
they were required to do so.. Instead, the current system allows MSHA to
play bait and switch with regulated parties by expressly inviting them to
rely on, for example, its own view of its jurisdiction in the Interagency
Agreement and Policy Manual while simultaneously claiming that neither
132 Id. at 1421-22.
" Id. at 1421.
134 id.
"' King Knob Coal Co., 3 FMSHRC at 1422.
136 "The Commission has repeatedly held that... estoppel does not generally apply against the
Secretary." See MSHA v. Martin Cnty. Coal Corp., 2006 WL 1814108 at *23 (2006); see also MSHA
v.U.S. Steel Mining Co., 15 FMSHRC 1541, 1546-47 (1993) (citing MSHA v. King Knob Coal Co., 3
FMSHRC 1417, 1421-22 (1981); MSHA v. Bulk Transp. Serv., Inc., 13 FMSHRC 1354, 1361 n.3
(1991)).
m~ Laitos, Smith & Mang, supra note 1 17 at 275-76.
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can be relied upon before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review
Commission.
Historically, estoppel has been greeted with skepticism when raised
against a government entity because of the "pressing public interest in the
enforcement of congressionally mandated public policy."138 Many courts,
as a precondition for allowing an estoppel claim against a government
entity, require a balancing of the public's interest of enforcement of the
congressionally mandated policy with the private interest of avoiding
injustice.19 This is a sensible and pragmatic approach; estoppel is
concededly not always the appropriate response to perceived injustices
when the government's ability to implement public policy is at stake.
However, as previously noted with reference to King Knob Coal Co., the
Commission has moved beyond mere pragmatism and has instead
embraced what appears to be a flat prohibition. 140 The Commission's
position is defensible and, in fact, probably appropriate with regard to
informal communications by MSHA officials to regulated parties regarding
the existence or non-existence of MSHA jurisdiction over a given activity,
such as those in Air Products & Chemicals.14 1 However, it is much harder
to justify the Commission's position on estoppel with respect to the Policy
Manual and Interagency Agreement. The Policy Manual and Interagency
Agreement are not fluid or ad-hoc assessments of MSHA jurisdiction by an
errant MSHA official.
Estopping MSHA on the basis of the Interagency Agreement and/or
Policy Manual entails very little risk that the public policy in favor of
guarding against occupational hazards will be undermined. If MSHA is
estopped from exercising jurisdiction in a given instance, then OSHA
standards regarding occupational safety and health would still apply. Also,
it should be noted that core mining activities are quite unlikely to trigger a
jurisdictional dispute that might give rise to an estoppel defense. Those
types of activities are squarely committed to MSHA under both the
Interagency Agreement and the MSHA Policy Manual. Rather, the defense
would most likely come into play with respect to activities that are on the
fringe of the definition of "coal or other mine" like the off-site mineral
crushing/breaking/sizing in Hermanl4 2 or the road construction in RBK
143Construction
Finally, if MSHA is estopped on the basis of the Policy Manual, it
is not without redress. MSHA can simply alter or remove the problem
language. Removal might cloud matters for regulated parties that would
13 United States v. Ven-Fuel, Inc., 758 F.2d 741, 761 (1st Cir. 1985).
13 Laitos, Smith & Mang, supra note 117 at 280-81.
140 King Knob Coal Co., 3 FMSHRC at 1417-18.
141 Air Prods. & Chems. v. MSHA, 15 FMSHRC 2428-29 (1993).
142 Herman v. Associated Elec. Coop, Inc., 172 F.3d 1078, 1080 (8th Cir. 1999).
143 MSHA. v. RBK Constr., 15 FMSHRC 2099, 2100 (1993).
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otherwise look to the Policy Manual or Interagency Agreement for
guidance, which would be regrettable. But, this is preferable to being lulled
into reliance on a pronouncement from MSHA concerning its jurisdiction
that MSHA is free to ignore at its convenience. It may be desirable for
MSHA to exercise broad jurisdiction, but it need not be given free rein to
take inconsistent positions regarding its jurisdiction in official
pronouncements that invite reliance by regulated parties. Also, while it does
not follow from the fact that MSHA sometimes takes inconsistent positions
that it is MSHA's objective to mislead,'" condoning this result stinks of
Justice Jackson's "administrative authoritarianism." 45
V. CONCLUSION
In the current regulatory environment, it is important that parties
who may be subject to MSHA jurisdiction exercise caution. There are two
reasons for this: (1) the guidance provided by the Interagency Agreement
and/or MSHA Policy Manual may be cold comfort; and (2) if history is any
indication, neither the Commission nor the federal judiciary will welcome
equitable estoppel arguments from those who get it wrong. Looking
forward, public policy would be better served by less judicial and
administrative hostility to equitable estoppel defenses where MSHA has
taken a position regarding the reach of its own jurisdiction in enforcement
proceedings that is inconsistent with a view it has taken in official
pronouncements like the Interagency Agreement and/or MSHA Policy
Manual.
MSHA has a very important role to play in ensuring that miners can
pursue their trade in relative safety. This note does not take the position that
contracted MSHA jurisdiction is an end to itself. Rather the current
jurisdictional framework is unpredictable, promotes bait and switch tactics,
and leads to outcomes that are inefficient for both MSHA and regulated
parties alike. If estoppel is credited as a viable defense, then one would
expect to see MSHA try to reconcile the positions it takes regarding its
jurisdiction in enforcement proceedings with the position it takes in official
'4 My research does not compel the conclusion that it is MSHA's objective and/or agency
culture to mislead regulated parties. Rather, to the extent that regulated parties are misled, this is more
likely due to the fact that decision-making at MSHA occurs at multiple levels. An MSHA inspector that
issues a citation to a regulated party may well believe in good faith that MSHA has jurisdiction on the
basis of the Interagency Agreement and Policy Manual. However, in a later regulatory enforcement
proceeding, it is more expedient for MSHA to argue that the Policy Manual and Interagency Agreement
are non-binding than it is for MSHA to argue that it has jurisdiction on the basis of these documents.
This note only takes the position that MSHA should be required to meet such arguments on their own
terms as opposed to rejecting the Interagency Agreement and Policy Manual as non-binding. Regulated
parties would still be required to show that MSHA is without jurisdiction on the basis of the Interagency
Agreement and Policy Manual.
145 See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 216-17 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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pronouncements. With greater transparency, regulated parties should have
less need for estoppel and MSHA should have more resources at its
disposal. In the long term, it may be worthwhile for Congress to consider
revisiting the statutory definition of "coal or other mine". 14 6 MSHA's
formulation of its jurisdiction, that it "has jurisdiction over operations
whose purpose it is to produce or extract a mineral,"l47 is an elegant
solution. Codifying it in the Mine Act would obligate courts and
administrators to interpret and develop it further.
'" See 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1) (2006).
147 PROGRAM POLICY MANUAL, supra note 10.
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